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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to figure out whether Aristotle’s response to the argu-
ment for fatalism in De Interpretatione 9 is a success. By “response” it is meant not 
simply the reasons Aristotle offers to highlight why fatalism does not accord with 
how we conduct our lives, but also the solution he devises to block the argument 
for fatalism. This paper finds that a) Aristotle’s argument for fatalism is essentially 
bivalence plus that the truth of a proposition implies necessity, b) that Aristotle’s 
solution is to restrict bivalence, c) that this solution is coherent, and d) that while 
this solution does not rule out the possibility of fatalism, it does succeed in block-
ing the argument for fatalism offered within chapter 9.
Keywords: Aristotle, fatalism.
Artículo recibido: 15 de septiembre del 2012; aceptado: 19 de noviembre del 2012.
* maistvanjr@gmail.com
[32]
departamento de filosofía • facultad de ciencias humanas • universidad nacional de colombia
M. A. Istvan Jr.
¿Es exitoso el argumento de Aristóteles  
respecto del fatalismo en De Interpretatione 9?
resumen 
El objetivo de este trabajo es esclarecer si la respuesta de Aristóteles al argumento 
a favor del fatalismo en De Interpretatione 9 resulta exitosa. Por “respuesta” se en-
tienden no solo las razones que da Aristóteles para destacar porqué el fatalismo no 
concuerda con la manera en que llevamos nuestras vidas, sino también la solución 
que ofrece para bloquear el argumento a favor del fatalismo. El artículo plantea a) 
que el argumento de Aristóteles respecto del fatalismo consiste esencialmente en 
la bivalencia más el hecho de que la verdad de una proposición implica necesidad; 
b) que la solución de Aristóteles es restringir la bivalencia; c) que esta solución es 
coherente, y d) que si bien esta solución no elimina la posibilidad del fatalismo, sí 
logra bloquear el argumento a favor del fatalismo ofrecido en el capítulo 9.
Palabras clave: Aristóteles, fatalismo.
O argumento de Aristóteles a respeito do  
fatalismo em De Interpretatione 9 é bem-sucedido?
Resumo
O objetivo deste trabalho é esclarecer se a resposta de Aristóteles ao argumento a 
favor do fatalismo em De Interpretatione 9 é bem-sucedida. Por “resposta” se en-
tendem não somente as razões que Aristóteles dá para destacar por que o fatalismo 
não está de acordo com a maneira em que levamos nossas vidas, mas também a 
solução que oferece para bloquear o argumento a favor do fatalismo. Este artigo 
propõe que: a) o argumento de Aristóteles a respeito do fatalismo consiste essen-
cialmente na bivalência mais o fato de que a verdade de uma proposição implica 
necessidade; b) a solução de Aristóteles é restringir a bivalência; c) essa solução é 
coerente, e d) embora essa solução não elimine a possiblidade do fatalismo, con-
segue bloquear o argumento a favor dele oferecido no capítulo 9.
Palavras-chave: Aristóteles, fatalismo.
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There has been a recent bloom of scholarship on De Interpretatione 
9 (9). Intellectuals tend to turn to this controversial text of Aristotle’s 
for one of two reasons: to figure out both the argument for fatalism 
and the solution to it presented within (cf. Anscombe 1-15; Whitaker 
1996; Hintikka 1964; Ackrill 1993 and Frede 1985), or else to use it as a 
platform for debating whether or not a proposition about a contingent 
future event should be evaluated as one of either true or false prior to 
the occurrence of that event (cf. Prior 1953; Lukasiewicz 1967b; Baylis 
1936; MacFarlane 2003; Bourne 122-128; Tweedale 2004 and Brogaard 
2007). Less often is the main focus to see if Aristotle’s counter to the 
argument he presents for fatalism, the doctrine that whatever hap-
pens was always bound to happen, succeeds. I think that the argument 
does succeed. 
In section one of this paper, I contend that the argument for fa-
talism in 9 is essentially the principle of bivalence (PB) plus that the 
truth of a proposition that an event will happen in the future en-
tails that this event will necessarily happen (a premise I abbreviate 
hereafter as “truth entails necessity”). In this section, I also contend 
that Aristotle’s solution to this argument is to restrict PB, but not the 
law of excluded middle (LEM), when it comes to propositions about 
contingent future events. In section two, I address problems for my 
interpretation of Aristotle’s solution, problems both to the effect that 
it does not align with the text and that it is an incoherent position 
in itself. In section three, I argue that the examples Aristotle gives 
as to why fatalism seems false are only meant to bolster, not prove, 
the antifatalist assumption to which he personally ascribes: that many 
possible futures could actualize. I explain as well that his solution, 
PB-restriction, does not rule out the possibility that fatalism is true, 
that is, that whatever future does not actualize was not truly possible. 
Nevertheless, I argue that his solution does succeed in blocking the 
argument that he presents for fatalism in 9. 
I
There seem to be three principle ways to understand the argu-
ment for fatalism in 9. a) PB –each proposition is one of either true or 
false (and no other option)– plus truth entails necessity. b) LEM –the 
disjunction between a proposition and its negation is true– plus truth 
entails necessity. c) RCP –for each contradictory pair of propositions, 
one member is true and the other false– plus truth entails necessity. 
If a) is how the argument works, then here is how it looks. Since 
each proposition is one of either true or false, any given FCP must be 
so too. If the FCP is true, then the FCE it describes is certain to happen, 
that is, it is necessary that it will happen (cf. Cicero 21). That the truth 
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of the FCP implies the necessity of the FCE it describes is clear in that 
if the FCE does not end up happening, then it is wrong to say that the 
FCP was true at the time of utterance. The same argument applies if 
the FCP is false. The falsity of the FCP entails the impossibility of the 
FCE it describes. Therefore, fatalism is true. 
If b) is how the argument works, then it looks the same as the 
above. For the only way I see LEM being useful for the fatalist view 
is if it entails PB. If LEM did not entail PB, in which case saying that p 
and not-p exhausts all the options (LEM) does not mean that each is 
one of either true or false (PB), then I do not see how it could help the 
argument for fatalism. After all, if there are many possible futures 
branching from now, some of which lead to p-event at the future date 
in question and some of which do not, then while it will be true that 
p and not-p exhaust all the options, the threat of fatalism will not 
appear if p is not currently one of true or false. Now, what reason do 
we have to suppose that LEM entails PB when LEM only tells us that 
the options are –p or not-p– whereas PB tells us that each proposition 
must be one of either true or false? The reasoning seems to be as fol-
lows. It is true that either p or not-p. If p, then p is true. If not-p, then 
p is false. Since it is either true that p or false that p, it follows that p 
must be one of them: true or false. If c) is how the argument works, 
then here is how it looks. Since for each contradictory pair of prop-
ositions one must be true and the other false, one FCP must be true 
and the other –its contradiction– false. Assume p is true. The FCE (p-
event) that p predicts cannot fail to occur, then. This just means that 
it is necessary that it occur. Therefore, fatalism is true. 
Those who read the argument for fatalism in terms of a) think 
that Aristotle’s solution is either to restrict PB for FCPs or to deny that 
truth entails necessity. Those who read the argument for fatalism in 
terms of b) think that his solution is either to restrict LEM for FCPs or 
to deny that truth entails necessity. Those who read the argument for 
fatalism in terms of c) think that his response is either to restrict RCP 
for FCPs or to deny that truth implies necessity. 
Concerning those who see Aristotle denying that truth implies ne-
cessity, I am aware of two approaches. If the FCP p is “a sea-battle will 
happen on 4-27-3003”, then –assuming that when 4-27-3003 comes 
around a sea-battle does happen– either p already has this value of true 
at any time prior to p-event happening or it has a value corresponding 
with what is more probable at the given time at which it could have 
been uttered, even if that value is not the same as what it turns out to 
have. Concerning those who see Aristotle as restricting LEM for FCPs, 
I am aware of two approaches: either restrict LEM and PB along with it 
or (cf. Bernstein 70) restrict LEM and keep PB. Concerning those who 
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see Aristotle as restricting PB for FCPs, I am aware of two approaches: 
either restrict PB and keep LEM1 or restrict PB and LEM along with it.2 
Concerning those who see Aristotle as restricting RCP for FCPs, there is 
only one approach on the assumption that the solution of RCP-restriction 
is not simply a function of one of the other restrictions and is therefore 
just one of those restrictions: keep PB and LEM but affirm that it is not yet 
settled which member of the pair is true and which one false. 
If Aristotle thinks that the fatalist argument is essentially LEM 
plus truth entails necessity, then his solution definitely is not to restrict 
LEM. He maintains LEM in 9, explaining that “It is necessary for there 
to be or not be as sea-battle tomorrow” (19a27). His claim here that 
the disjunction between p and not-p is necessary, that it is necessary 
that these are the only options, clearly means that this disjunction is 
true, that it is true that these are the only options. Aristotle maintains 
LEM in Metaphysics too. He explains that one thing must be either 
asserted or denied of any one subject (cf. 1011b). That is to say, the only 
options are either b –x is A– or not-b –x is not A. This is precisely LEM. 
Finally, that Aristotle seems unwilling to restrict LEM just makes good 
sense. What other possibility is there besides a sea-battle happening 
on 4-27-3003 or a sea-battle not happening on 4-27-3003? A sea-battle 
half happening on that date? But even if it is one-sixteenth happening 
it is still happening. If this is not the case, that is, if a sea-battle one-
sixteenth happening does not suffice for a sea-battle happening, then 
this just means that a sea-battle is not happening. So the disjunction 
between p and not-p seems to have to be true. The three aforemen- 
tioned interpretations that have Aristotle restricting LEM for FCPs 
should be abandoned, then. 
Let us move on to the interpretation that the argument for fatal-
ism is RCP plus truth entails necessity, and that Aristotle’s solution to 
it is to restrict RCP in the case of FCPs without as well restricting PB (or 
LEM) for RCP (cf. Whitaker 110-112). According to this interpretation, 
RCP is violated for Aristotle in the case of FCPs because, given that the 
future situation in question is not yet settled, it is not yet settled “which 
member of the pair [of FCPs] is true and which is false” (id. 111, 130). 
Here is the problem with this interpretation. How is PB pre-
served, as Whitaker claims that it is (cf. 112), when the truth-values 
have yet to be distributed to the members of the contradictory pair? 
1 Kneale and Strang say that this is what Aristotle is trying to do (cf. Kneale and 
Kneale 1962; Strang 1960). Many have said that this maneuver is, as Anscombe says, 
“a howler” (9). 
2 Lukasiewicz explicitly says that Aristotle denies bivalence. But in the many-valued 
logical system Lukasiewicz comes up with (primarily because of 9), LEM is restricted 
too for disjunctions between p and not-p when p-event is a FCE (cf. 1967a 16-18). 
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One explanation is that by PB Whitaker, the chief and original pro-
ponent of this interpretation, really means LEM. If so, then when he 
says that RCP is restricted and yet PB is preserved he means that while 
it is not yet ineluctably settled how the two possible truth-values are 
to be distributed between the members of the contradictory pair 
(meaning that RCP is restricted), it is still the case that the only op-
tions are that a sea-battle will occur on 4-27-3003 or that one will not 
(meaning that LEM is preserved). 
Alas, this does not seem to be the right explanation. Whitaker de-
fines PB rightly as every proposition is one of either true or false, not 
as that the disjunction between a proposition and its negation is true 
(LEM) (cf. 111). The question arises once again, then. How can PB be 
preserved, and yet RCP be restricted in the way that Whitaker says RCP 
is in the case of FCPs-restricted not in the sense that a) both members 
are true or that b) both are false, but that c) it is not yet settled which 
is which? I understand how PB is maintained with the other two vio-
lations of RCP that Aristotle points out in the previous two chapters: 
7 and 8. These concern how both members of a contradictory pair 
can have the same truth-value, which clearly does not violate PB since 
regardless as to whether the members are both false or both true it 
is still the case that each on its own is one of either true or false. But 
how can Whitaker say, on the one hand, that each member of the con-
tradictory pair is one of either true or false and yet say, on the other 
hand, that the two possible truth-values of the contradictory pair have 
yet to be distributed among the members. How can it be that it is not 
ineluctably settled which member is true and which false when it is 
still the case that each is one of either true or false? I would think that 
if RCP is violated (as Whitaker takes it to be), then p would be neither 
true nor false, which Whitaker unequivocally agrees would be a PB 
violation (cf. 112). I would think that to deny that it is settled which 
one gets what value is to deny that each disjunct, taken in isolation, 
is one of either true or false. And I would think that to affirm that p 
is one of either true or false and that not-p is too is to affirm that the 
truth-values have in fact been distributed. Whitaker’s interpretation 
thus seems incoherent to me. The only thing I can think of is that per-
haps when Whitaker says that it is not yet settled which member gets 
what truth-value he just means that, due to our lack of knowledge, we 
do not know how it is in fact already settled. The problem with this is 
that he unequivocally denies that this is what he is saying (cf. id. 111). 
If it is not that by PB Whitaker means LEM, or that by RCP-
restriction he means that we just do not know how the truth values are 
distributed, then what other explanation can there be for one holding 
such an interpretation? In addition to these two, I can only conceive 
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of one more explanation for Whitaker saying that, for Aristotle, even 
though members of a contradictory pair are one of either true or false 
it is not yet settled which one is true and which one is false. Perhaps 
Whitaker is making a distinction between a) a proposition actually 
being one of either true or false, on the one hand, and b) a proposition 
having to be one of either true or false, on the other. And when he is 
saying that, in the case of FCPs, PB is upheld even though RCP is not, he 
is saying that each member of the contradictory pair of FCPs has to be 
one of either true or false where that does not as well mean that each 
actually is one of either true or false. If my diagnosis is correct, then 
he is being lured by the fact that a) and b) are to some extent different 
in sense: a) stresses the reality and b) stresses the rule. Nevertheless, 
if it is a rule that a proposition must be either true or false, then –lest 
the rule be restricted– the proposition must actually be one of the 
two. The separation is illegal in this case. 
Even if Whitaker’s view is incoherent, that is no definitive argu-
ment against it being Aristotle’s view. Nevertheless, I do think that a 
quite definitive case against it being Aristotle’s view can be made. 
First off I should say that I agree with Whitaker that Aristotle does 
restrict RCP when it comes to FCPs. Contrary to Whitaker, however, I 
think that this restriction is a consequence of Aristotle’s restriction 
of PB. Here is strong piece of textual evidence showing that a major 
premise in 9’s fatalist argument is RCP. Aristotle explicitly says that 
fatalism is the queer result that follows “if it is necessary, for every 
affirmation and negation either about universals spoken of universally 
or about particulars, that one of the opposites be true and the other 
false” (18b27-30). And now here is a strong piece of textual evidence 
that Aristotle’s solution is to restrict RCP for FCPs. Just as he ends the 
two prior chapters that showed restrictions to RCP, he ends 9 by saying 
“it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one 
should be true and the other false” (19a39). Aristotle is ending 9 by 
saying the following, in effect: “I have once again shown –as I did two 
previous times (one in chapter 7, the other in chapter 8)– that RCP need 
not always obtain between contradictory pairs.” 
On now to why Whitaker’s interpretation is not true of Aristotle. 
That Aristotle restricts RCP but not as well PB when it comes to FCPs is 
evident in that the argument for fatalism in 9 does not always proceed 
by saying that fatalism follows if out of FCP pair p and not-p one must 
be true and the other false (RCP). Sometimes it proceeds just on the basis 
of the fact that if an isolated FCP must be one of either true or false (PB), 
then fatalism follows. As the fatalist in 9 says: if the desk is white now it 
was true ten thousand years ago to say that it would be white (cf. Aristotle 
18b9). To be sure, every affirmation has its negation (cf. Aristotle 17a30). 
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So with the FCP “the desk will be white exactly ten thousand years from 
now” we are dealing with a member of a contradictory pair –the other 
member being: “the desk will not be white exactly ten thousand years 
from now”. But here the fatalist is just concerned with an isolated mem-
ber rather than with the rule that one must be true and the other false. It 
suffices that the one he is considering alone is one of either true or false, 
as PB would have it. 
What does Whitaker’s Aristotle have to say to the fatalist that 
does not want to talk about contradictory pairs, but only isolated 
FCPs? Scold him for not cooperating? Whitaker might insist: If you 
are talking about a FCP, then you are, like it or not, talking about a 
contradictory pair because the FCP in question is a member of such 
a pair. That is why Aristotle’s solution can simply be to say that it is 
not yet settled which member is true or which one is false. 
To this the fatalist should offer the following response: “But didn’t 
you say I can still have PB?” After Whitaker responds “Yes”, the fatalist 
will just say that whatever value this one FCP has, it makes certain –if 
true– or impossible –if false– what it predicts. This I take it the fatal-
ist meant from the beginning of his argument when he said: “if every 
affirmation or negation is true or false it is necessary for everything 
either to be the case or not be the case” (Aristotle 18a34). Because he 
has granted that PB is preserved, Whitaker cannot respond that this 
FCP has no value yet. His view then would have to shift to an inter-
pretation that has Aristotle’s solution being that truth does not entail 
necessity, which Whitaker does not want.
Another problem for Whitaker’s interpretation is that, contrary 
to what Whitaker believes (cf. 1996 113), the first line of 9 seems to refer 
to PB –asserting that PB obtains with respect to statements concerning 
the present or the past. This is significant because the last line of the 
first paragraph seems to say –and this Whitaker seconds– that the 
principle to which the first line refers is not going to hold for FCPs. Let 
us look at how Aristotle opens 9. 
[1)] With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for 
the affirmation or the negation to be true or false. [2)] And with [a)] 
universals taken universally it is always necessary for one to be true and 
the other false; and with [b)] particulars too, as we said; but with [c)] 
universals not spoken of universally it is not necessary. But with [d)] 
particulars that are going to be it is different. (18a28-18a33) 
It is clear that in the second line Aristotle is saying a) that when 
an affirmation and its negation are about universals taken univer- 
sally (“every man is white” and “not every man is white”), or b) about 
particulars taken universally (“Socrates is white” and “Socrates is not 
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white”), then they are contradictory (as opposed to contrary) pairs 
–since the negation of an affirmation is its contradiction (cf. Aristotle 
18a9)– and one member of each of these pairs must be true and the 
other false (RCP). Where RCP does not hold up, as Aristotle disclosed 
in the previous two chapters and is now reminding us in c), is in pairs 
of contradictory propositions about a universal not taken universally 
(“a man is noble” and “a man is not noble”). Then he says in d) that 
things are going to be different, that is, that this is not the case, when 
it comes to particular propositions about the future. 
When it comes to c), sentence 2) rules out the possibility that 1) 
refers to RCP. Here is why. In c) Aristotle is referring to the two pre-
vious restrictions that he made to RCP. In particular, these restrictions 
showed that regarding what is, that is, what is present, it is not neces-
sary for one member of the contradictory pair to be true and the other 
false. The thing is, if 1) refers to RCP, then 1) –the statement that it is 
necessary for the affirmation or negation about the past or present to 
be true or false– would be the statement that it is necessary that out of 
every affirmation-negation pair about the past or present one member 
must be true and the other false. This is significant because c) directly 
contradicts this. Hence if Whitaker is right about 1) referring to RCP, 
then Aristotle would be affirming something with sentence 1) that he 
directly contradicts in the very next breath, in part c) of sentence 2). 
And if that were not bad enough, the very lines prior to 1) state one 
of the cases of RCP-restriction to which c) is referring. What we have 
on Whitaker’s reading of 1), then, is that 1) would be both a direct 
contradiction of the sentences directly preceding it as well as the sen-
tence directly proceeding it. Although Whitaker takes the fact that 1) 
is sandwiched between references to RCP to be evidence that 1) must 
be referring to RCP (cf. 113), this cannot be the case. 
From what I have shown, it is clear that 1) ought to be saying some-
thing that holds both at times when RCP is restricted in one of the two 
ways Aristotle previously pointed out it could be and at times when 
it is not. The only other option is that 1) is referring to PB and thus is 
saying that it is necessary for both the affirmation and the negation 
about the past or the present to be one of either true or false. But 
does PB hold when RCP is violated in the previous ways mentioned? 
And does it hold as well when RCP obtains? The answer to both is yes. 
When a pair of affirmations and negations about the past follows RCP, 
then clearly PB holds. And the two RCP-restrictions Aristotle brought 
up previously involved either both members of the contradictory pair 
being true or both being false. Clearly in either case PB holds. 
Now that it is clear that PB is the rule to which 1) is referring, let 
me show that d) must be stating that this rule is not going to hold for 
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FCPs. If d) is not stating that PB is not going to apply to FCPs, then the 
only other option is that it is stating that the rule-restriction that was 
mentioned right before it in c), RCP-restriction, is not going to hold 
for FCPs. In one sense at least this is a quite natural reading. For d) 
says that in regards to FCEs this will not be the case, and it is natural 
to understand by “this” here what the preceding line, c), stated: RCP-
restriction. If this is the correct reading, then this means that RCP will 
hold for future-tense propositions about particulars. In this case, we 
will have as well PB preserved. And so for fatalism not to follow, it 
must be the case that Aristotle is denying that truth entails necessity. 
The thing is, it does not seem that RCP is what is upheld. As the end of 
9 shows, the opposite is the case. Aristotle ends, as he did in the pre-
vious two chapters, with voicing how RCP is restricted for FCPs:
it is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation one 
should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does 
not hold for things that are not but may possible be or not be. (19a39ff)
We ought to go with the other view, then: that 1) is what d) is not 
going to be like, in which case FCPs will not be either true or false. 
If Aristotle begins with saying there will be a restriction of PB, is 
it not odd that he concludes with saying there is a restriction on RCP? 
Not when it is precisely the restriction of PB that entails a restriction 
on RCP, which is something that should already be clear given that a) 
RCP requires PB and that b) Aristotle goes back and forth about talking 
about pairs of contradictory FCPs (how if one must be true and the 
other false then fatalism seems to follow) and FCPs in isolation (how if 
every FCP is one of either true or false then fatalism seems to follow). 
Let us look at the end again.
[I]t is not necessary that of every affirmation and opposite negation 
one should be true and the other false [RCP-restriction]. For what holds 
for things that are does not hold for things that are not but may possible 
be or not be. (Aristotle 19a39ff)
As Aristotle told us at the beginning of 9 when he said that each 
affirmation and opposite negation about the present or past will be 
one of either true or false, what holds for things that are, present 
things, is precisely PB. He is saying, then, that PB is what does not hold 
for things that are not but may possibly be, and that this is precisely 
the reason for the RCP-restriction. So because PB does not hold for 
these things, we have now an explanation for what turns out to be, as 
Whitaker is right to note, the third exception to RCP in 9. Unlike the 
other restrictions of RCP, what is unique about this one is that it is a 
consequence of a restriction of PB. 
[41]Is Aristotle’s Response to the Argument for Fatalism...
ideas y valores · vol. lxiii · n.o 155 • agosto 2014 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 31 - 58
“Wait”, one may interrupt me here. “Could not it be the case that 
‘by what holds for things that are’ (19a39ff) Aristotle means RCP?” 
Here is one reason not to accept this. If this view is supposed to mean 
that, in the end, PB is maintained whereas RCP is not, then what is 
suggested is going to be restricted at the beginning does not end up 
being restricted at the end. In addition, we get the incoherent view 
again of Whitaker’s that I addressed above. Moreover, by the “what” 
in “what holds for things that are” (19a39ff) Aristotle cannot mean 
RCP. Indeed, this is for the same reason that he could not mean RCP 
in the first sentence of 9: it is not the case that, out of any affirma-
tion and opposite negation about all things that are, one will be true 
the other false. Aristotle has shown that there are exceptions to RCP 
for contradictory pairs of propositions for things that are. Therefore, 
while Aristotle is restricting RCP at the end of 9 (cf. 19a39), the reason 
he gives for it is that he is restricting PB (cf. 19b2). 
Now is a good opportunity to move on to the interpretation that 
sees Aristotle denying that truth entails necessity as opposed to re-
stricting PB. No view of necessity could be meant by “what holds for 
things that are but does not for FCEs”. This rules out the interpretation 
since it is precisely the denial or restriction of that which Aristotle 
means to indicate by the term what here that is Aristotle’s solution to 
the argument for fatalism. Let me explain why this is the case. 
First let me lay out the options for what Aristotle can mean for 
“what holds for all things that are here" (19a39ff). By “what holds for 
things that are” (ibd.), Aristotle can mean that the propositions about 
them have one of the two possible truth-values, that they are uncondi-
tionally necessary, that is, have always been bound to occur at all times 
prior to when they occurred and so are unalterable even before they 
are occurring or have occurred, or that they are merely temporally 
necessary, that is, made unalterable merely by the fact that they are 
already occurring or else by the fact that they have already occurred. 
In short, by what in “what holds for things that are” (ibd.) Aristotle 
could mean PB, unconditional necessity, or temporal necessity. 
Now, let me explain why Aristotle is not going to mean either of 
these two senses of necessity by the term what here. Clearly he is not 
going to mean that unconditional necessity holds for things that are. 
That would be to admit fatalism, which he denies (cf. Aristotle 19a24). 
And this is not even to mention the fact that if Aristotle’s solution to 
the argument for fatalism is to deny that truth implies unconditional 
necessity, then there would be no reason for him to be restricting RCP 
here at the conclusion of 9 anyway. Now, it is also clear that Aristotle 
is not going to mean that temporal necessity holds for things that are 
but does not hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be. 
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Again, temporal necessity refers both to the necessity something has 
when it is (insofar as when it is it cannot at the same time not be) and 
to the necessity something has when it is past (because it cannot now 
be undone) (cf. Taylor 10-11). So think about it. It being the case that 
temporal necessity does not hold for all things that are not but pur-
portedly may be or not possibly have yet to arise, that is, it being the 
case that all supposed FCEs have not been made unalterable since they 
have not even happened yet, does nothing to thwart fatalism. When 
one of the purported FCEs in question has been made unalterable by 
the lapse of time, the fatalist will just say that it was true from time 
immemorial that that FCE was going to happen. So the solution to the 
fatalist’s argument must be either a) to restrict PB for FCPs or b) to deny 
that truth implies unconditional necessity. As I just argued, however, 
the interpretation that the solution is b) is ruled out by the text. 
I believe that what I have said rules out the interpretation that 
Aristotle’s solution to the fatalist’s argument is to deny that truth 
implies necessity. Nevertheless, I will take the time to address in-
dividually the two ways to construe Aristotle’s denying that truth 
implies necessity. My reason for continuing to build a case against 
this interpretation is not simply because more evidence cannot hurt. 
And it definitely cannot hurt given that some have claimed, I believe, 
that Aristotle did not write the last two sentences of 9, which are the 
sentences from which I have drawn most of my previous arguments 
against this interpretation. Continuing to build a case against this 
interpretation will also give me the opportunity to explain why I be-
lieve that the restriction of PB is necessary for FCPs. Not only will this 
count (at least slightly) as additional evidence for my claim that PB-
restriction is Aristotle’s solution to the argument for fatalism in 9, it 
will also show that this solution makes good sense, which I want to do 
since the task of my paper is to show that Aristotle’s solution succeeds.
Now, what are the two ways to construe Aristotle’s denying that 
truth implies necessity? a) Aristotle could be denying that truth entails 
necessity in spite of the fact that the FCP always has the truth-value 
of what will be true, that is, in spite of the fact that whatever ends up 
turning out true was always true. Or else, b) he could be denying that 
truth entails necessity because a FCP being true is only a matter of it 
being more probable than it being false at the given time it is imagined 
to be uttered, and its being false is only a matter of it being less prob-
able than it being true at that given time. 
What b) has going for it is that if what is true is what is merely 
probable, then (unlike the case with a)) it is clear why the truth that 
an event will occur is not guaranteed. What is merely probable is by 
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definition what is not guaranteed. So assuming that p is “a sea-battle 
will occur on 4-27-3003,” it follows according to b) that if at the time 
of imagined utterance –say 1-11-1000– p-event occurring was more 
probable than it not, then p is true. But since true only means prob-
able here, p-event is not certain to happen. What b) does not have 
going for it, though, is that (unlike the case with a)) even if it happens 
to be that p-event does not occur when 4-27-3003 comes around, it 
seems not to be the case that on 1-11-1000 p was false. Again, this is 
because on 1-11-1000 p was true insofar as it was more probable to 
occur. The problem is, it just feels right to say, as Aristotle himself 
seems to (cf. 18b9), that if p proved false on 4-27-3003, then it was true 
to say, even back at 1-11-1000, that p was false. 
To this, a proponent of b) will respond in the following way, I 
think. Once it has already been settled by the lapse of time that not-p 
is the case, then it is the case indeed that on 1-11-1000 p was false. How 
can this be when on 1-11-1000 p was true –true because it was more 
probable? We must make a distinction here. On the one hand, there is 
α-1-11-1000, that is, 1-11-1000 as it is before the event (and so too before 
the future-coursing path that led to it) actualized before the event (and 
so too before the future-coursing path that led to it) actualized, where 
by this I mean to indicate the 1-11-1000 that only has possible-to-be-
actualized but nonactual future-paths forking from it. On the other 
hand, there is β-1-11-1000, that is, 1-11-1000 as it is before the event 
(and so too before the future-coursing path that led to it) actualized 
after the event (and so too after the future-coursing path that led to it) 
actualized, where by this I mean to indicate the 1-11-1000 that only 
has one actual future coursing from it: the one that ended up actual-
izing. It is because at α-1-11-1000 the predicted p-event was more likely 
to occur than not that I say p is true at 1-11-1000. And it is because at 
β-1-11-1000 the predicted p-event could not but fail to occur that I say 
p is false at 1-11-1000. Realize that α-1-11-1000 and β-1-11-1000 capture 
two deep-seated intuitions that we have. On the one hand, α-1-11-1000 
captures our intuition that if the future is truly open to some extent 
(which itself we find intuitive), then FCPs being true or false is going 
to be a matter of the FCEs they pick out being more or less probable 
to occur than not to occur. If today “the admirals are confident and 
in a fighting mood, and their intelligence underestimates the power 
of the enemy” (Hintikka 488), then –unless some additional states of 
affairs obtain that actually make it unlikely that the battle will begin–
tomorrow’s sea-battle is likely to occur, in which case the prediction 
that it will is true now. On the other hand, β-1-11-1000 captures our 
intuition that once the future date in question unfolds, such that any 
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predictions about it are now settled, it would be strange to say that a 
prediction that turned out true was not true prior to the future un-
folding. “When we are actually standing on deck with a sea-battle 
going on all around, it is tempting to think that my earlier assertion 
[that there would be a sea battle on this date] was true” (Brogaard 327). 
This proponent of b) makes a good point. She is onto something 
important, I think, with this distinction between α-1-11-1000 and β-1-
11-1000. There is at least one fatal flaw with b) being true of Aristotle, 
however: Aristotle thinks that some FCEs are equally likely to occur 
as not to occur. To be sure, some things are more probable to occur 
than not for Aristotle. As a rule, we might say, men do not live past 
150 years of age. In this case, it is more probable that I will not live 
past 150 years of age than that I will –although, Aristotle says, it is 
still possible that this will not happen (cf. 19a22). However, he says 
that “some things happen as chance has it, and of the affirmation and 
the negation neither is true rather than the other” (19a19). By this he 
means that some things are equiprobable to occur.3 For right after he 
says “some things happen as chance has it” (19a19) he says “with other 
things it is one rather than the other as a rule, but still it is possible for 
the other to happen instead” (19a20). Things that happen more often 
than not as a rule are those things that are more probable than not to 
occur. The implication of Aristotle describing these more-probable-
to-occur-than-not-to-occur things as the “other things” is that the 
first things are those that are equally likely to occur or not occur. So 
because he does believe that some events are equally likely to occur, if 
the FCE that FCP p picks out is equally likely to occur as not occur at 
least at the time when it is imagined p is being uttered (α-1-11-1000, of 
course), then she would have to admit that p is not one of either true 
or false. For at α-1-11-1000 there are, as the proponent of b) herself 
admitted, many possible paths forking forwards to the future date in 
question: 4-27-3003. 
It may be that Aristotle considers some FCPs true when the FCEs 
they pick out are, given the ontological states of affairs at the imag-
ined time of utterance, more likely to occur than not.4 But surely 
it is odd to say that since not-p –“on the next toss of the die the result 
will not be a three”– has a probability of 5/6 it is true. Would not it be 
right just to say that it is more likely? I guess on this interpretation the 
usual strength of the word “true” will be found in the phrase “nec- 
essarily true” or as Boethius and Ammonious, who might also be 
3 Hintikka seems to be making the same criticism of this view, although he does not 
address Anscombe as the one who holds it (Hintikka 488). 
4 Anscombe, a proponent of b), seems to believe that this is the case (cf. 8). 
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advocates of this view, say: “definitely true” (cf. Sorabji 93).5 In this 
case I guess it is not odd that not-p is true because we still have a way 
to indicate true-true (with “necessarily true”), and not-p is not true-
true. It will only become true-true, necessarily true, when the lapse 
of time settles the issue. But even if all this is true of Aristotle, this 
still does not do away with my interpretation that Aristotle restricts 
PB. For there truly are FCEs that, for him, are equally likely to occur 
as not to occur. This, along with other pieces of evidence, is why in-
terpretation b) must be dropped. 
I will turn now to interpretation a), that FCPs have always had the 
truth-value they will have when the issue is settled, and yet that does 
not mean that the FCEs they predict must occur. According to this 
interpretation, if S actualized on 4-27-3003, then the FCP predicting 
it was always true, even on 1-11-1000. See, PB holds for all proposi-
tions, including FCPs. And surely it is the case that the existence of a 
proposition does not rely on it having been uttered. In this case, at any 
arbitrary point in the actual past, such as 1-11-1000, we can imagine 
one uttering this FCP, and it will have been true then. And yet, so the 
view goes, its truth does not entail the necessity of this event. 
How can this be? Turn to the previous distinction between α-1-11-
1000 and β-1-11-1000. There are two ways to regard the actual point in 
time 1-11-1000. On the one hand, there is α-1-11-1000, that is, 1-11-1000 
as it is prior to S actualizing, and thereby prior to the actualization 
of the one and only path to 4-27-3003 that will end up actualizing 
from the actual point at 1-11-1000, when in the future beyond 1-11-
1000 myriad merely possible but nonactual paths forking towards 
4-27-3003 is all there is. In short, there is 1-11-1000 considered rela-
tive to before S and this path actualized, considered relative to before 
these actualized in the sense of relative to when any of the possible but 
non-actual paths forking into the future truly had a chance at actual-
izing. It is of course permitted to regard 1-11-1000 in this way, which is 
something with which Aristotle would agree given that he holds that 
not everything that is necessarily is (cf. 19a24). For on the assump-
tion that fatalism is false, that is, on the assumption that “the future 
is partially undetermined and in its very nature ambiguous” (Taylor 
26) such that “an omniscient being would have to comprehend it just 
that way” (ibd.), there had to be a 1-11-1000 from which forked into 
the future many merely possible but non-actual paths –paths any one 
of which could actualize. For this reason, one who said that p-event 
5 Boethius and Ammonious say that all FCPs are one of either true or false for Aristotle. 
It is just that they are not definitely true or false until the lapse of time settles the issue 
(cf. Sorabji 93). 
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might or might not occur, and thus that p is not one of either true or 
false, would be right on 1-11-1000 considered this way. 
On the other hand, there is β-1-11-1000 as it is prior to S actu-
alizing, and thereby prior to the actualization of the one and only 
path to 4-27-3003 that did end up actualizing from the actual point 
at 1-11-1000, when in the future beyond 1-11-1000 the one and only 
path to 4-27-3003 that actualized from the actual point at 1-11-1000 
is all there is. In short, there is 1-11-1000 considered relative to after 
S and this path actualized, considered relative to after these actu-
alized in the sense of relative to when there was only one path that 
could have actualized: the one that did. It is of course permitted to 
regard 1-11-1000 in this way, which is something with which Aristotle 
would agree given that he does give voice to the highly intuitive fact 
that if p-event occurred it would have been true to say it would occur 
(cf. 18b9). For even on the assumption that fatalism is false, 1-11-1000 
regarded this way has only this one path shooting from it that could 
have actualized. For this reason, one who said that p-event will occur 
would be right on 1-11-1000 considered this way. Fatalism, of course, 
is not entailed by 1-11-1000 considered this way because the reason 
why there is only one path shooting from it is not that that path was 
necessitated to occur prior to it occurring, but rather simply because 
the lapse of time imposed a necessity upon it. The idea is, then, that 
fatalism is not entailed by β-1-11-1000. After all, it was true that α-1-11-
1000 really obtained. 
It is plain to anyone that if we are saying that on α-1-11-1000 p–
the FCE stating “S will actualize on 4-27-3003” –was true, then this 
means that S, the nominal terminus of q-path and many other pos-
sible paths as well, was fated to actualize. It is plain to anyone that if 
FCP q, which predicts that the path that did end up actualizing from 
the actual point at 1-11-1000 to 4-27-3003 will actualize, was true on 
α-1-11-1000, then the q-path was fated to actualize. Think about it. On 
the supposition that fatalism is false, there is such a 1-11-1000 as α-1-
11-1000. From α-1-11-1000, which we are supposing to be the nominal 
terminus of an actual path stemming from the remote actual past, 
myriad possible-to-actualize but nonactual paths from 1-11-1000 fork 
towards 4-27-3003: n-path, o-path, p-path, q-path, r-path, and so on. 
If FCP q, which says that q-path will actualize, is true on α-1-11-1000, 
then that just means there really is no plurality of possible paths after 
all. Is not it so very clear, then, that q must not be one of either true or 
false on α-1-11-1000?
If 4-27-3003 has already arrived, then when one thinks of q being 
uttered on 1-11-1000, one must be careful not to let the fact that the 
issue has already been settled prevent one from considering 1-11-1000 
[47]Is Aristotle’s Response to the Argument for Fatalism...
ideas y valores · vol. lxiii · n.o 155 • agosto 2014 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 31 - 58
as α-1-11-1000, the way 1-11-1000 was prior to any path starting to ac-
tualize from it towards the future. That, I think, is what is happening 
with these people who think that q being true on 1-11-1000 does not 
entail that the q-path was fated. Instead of assessing q relative to all 
the possible-to-actualize paths, that is, relative to α-1-11-1000, they as-
sess q only relative to the one path that did in fact actualize: q-path. 
What else could explain why they are so confident that q being true 
on 1-11-1000 does not entail that q-path was fated to occur except that 
they in effect assess q only relative to β-1-11-1000?6 
Here is the problem. The mere fact that q is true on β-1-11-1000 
does not suffice to show that q can be true on 1-11-1000 without any 
implications of fatalism. A necessary condition of q not having been 
fated is that there actually was α-1-11-1000. For the explanation for 
why q-path did not have to actualize is that forking into the future 
from 1-11-1000 were myriad possible but non-actual paths, any of 
which could have actualized, among which q-path –as it was only 
as a mere possible path, of course– was only one. So if we are being 
thoroughgoing in our investigation as to whether or not q being true 
on 1-11-1000 testifies to fatalism, then we cannot avoid seeing what is 
meant by q-being true on α-1-11-1000. Think about it. q being true on 
β-1-11-1000 only tells you that q-path has already actualized and so is 
now past and so has the irrevocability that the lapse of time imposes 
on all things, even the contingent. To be sure, that q-path has such 
temporal necessity does not mean that it was fated to actualize in the 
first place the way that for Aristotle the sun rising is.7 However, that 
does not mean that it was not fated either. The thing is, that there was 
α-1-11-1000 guarantees that it was not fated. Therefore, given the as-
sumption to which the interpreters in question themselves say they 
ascribe, that fatalism is false, one must assess q relative to α-1-11-1000. 
What we find when we do is that q is not one of either true or false. For 
forking from α-1-11-1000 are many possible paths any one of which 
could actualize, not just q-path. 
Let me repeat the point in a different way. On the one hand, intu-
ition tells us that since myriad other truly possible-to-actualize paths 
forking into the future truly could have actualized, q is not one of 
either true or false on 1-11-1000. After all, that q-path might or might 
not have actualized is a necessary inference from the fact that other 
paths besides it truly could have actualized. This intuition, it is clear, 
is only correct when we are considering 1-11-1000 qua α-1-11-1000, 
6 I have in mind people such as Baylis (cf. 162).
7 On this idea that Aristotle would regard the sun’s rising to be a matter of necessity see 
Anscombe (cf. 14). 
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though. On the other hand, intuition tells us that since q-path did 
actualize, q is true on 1-11-1000. After all, that q-path was going to 
actualize is a necessary inference from the fact that it did actualize 
(cf. Cicero §18; Aristotle 18b10). This intuition, it is clear, is only cor-
rect when we are considering 1-11-1000 qua β-1-11-1000, though. Now, 
nothing precludes us from considering 1-11-1000 qua β-1-11-1000 even 
on the supposition that fatalism is false; fatalism being false does not 
necessarily mean that this second intuition leads us wrong, in other 
words. It is just that there is α-1-11-1000 as well on the supposition that 
fatalism is false. But if there is α-1-11-1000, then it is absurd to hold the 
view that PB always applying to FCPs does not testify to the fact that 
fatalism is true. The FCP p is not one of either true or false on α-1-11-
1000 due to considerations of symmetry: p-event is slated to actualize 
on some possible paths into the future but not on others.8 Indeed, 
Aristotle would even say that since the future is thus unsettled in re-
gards to whether p-event will actualize, p at α-1-11-1000 is actually 
caused to be unsettled in regards to its truth-value. The idea is that p’s 
truth-value does not just reflect (cf. Aristotle 4b8, 19a32), but is actu-
ally caused by the way things are (cf. Aristotle 14b22), and the way 
things are is unsettled. 
In the end it is important to realize that the PB-restriction when 
it comes to p relative to α-1-11-1000 not only is required both in truth 
and for Aristotle on the assumption that fatalism is false, but it also 
actually explains why the determinate truth-value assigned to it after 
what it predicts comes true does not testify to the fact that fatalism 
is true. Regarding this second point, then, the interpretation that 
Aristotle denies that truth entails necessity is only incorrect so far 
as it is construed as excluding the interpretation that he restricts PB 
when it comes to FCPs. 
II
Aristotle’s view is as follows: while a disjunction of FCP q and not-q 
is always true (LEM), and while both q and not-q are one of either true 
or false on β-1-11-1000 (PB), neither q nor not-q is one of either true or 
false on α-1-11-1000 (PB-restriction).9 I will now field some objections 
8 Since the FCE will actualize on some possible future and yet not on others, the FCP 
that picks it out is not true in every case and yet not false in every case. Hence it is not 
one of either true or false. If, say, the FCE did actualize on every possible future, then 
symmetry considerations would compel us to say that it was true. For more on this 
idea, see van Fraassen (1966 28-35). 
9 Many agree that something like this is Aristotle’s view in 9 (cf. Kneale 47; Prior 1953 
325-326 and Taylor 2). 
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either to the effect that Aristotle did not hold this or that this is inco-
herent in itself. 
Objection 1: Aristotle tells us at the end of Chapter 4 that for the 
rest of the time he will only be dealing with propositions, or what 
he calls “statement-making sentences” (16b33-17a7) of which affirma-
tions and negations are types (cf. 17a20-21). These are the sentences 
that are not merely significant, as are all sentences, but are also true 
or false. So lest we suppose that Aristotle is breaking his promise, this 
must mean that FCPs are true or false. Indeed, what he says a little bit 
later corroborates this. He explains that when “is”, “was”, “will be”, or 
something of the sort is combined with a name or some other signifi-
cant spoken sound the result is a sentence that is always true or false 
(cf. 16b3, 17a11). Yet you are saying that Aristotle’s solution is to make 
FCPs neither true nor false, in which case you would have him contra-
vene his own position: that PB holds for affirmations and negations, 
that is, for statement-making sentences (cf. 16b35-36).
Reply: FCPs are one of either true or false in a sense: the β-1-11-
1000 sense, if you will. This alone, I know, does not save me. For it is 
still the case that on α-1-11-1000 FCPs are not one of either true or false. 
But I bring it up in order to highlight that it is not so simple to say that 
PB does or does not apply to them. Given the complexity of the issue, 
it is reasonable to assume that Aristotle avoided getting into it for the 
sake of clarity. At these earlier points in the text, such as at Chapter 4, 
his objective is to express how significant spoken sounds come to have 
truth and falsity ascribed to them. As a rule they must have a verb 
or an inflexion of a verb (cf. Aristóteles 17a10). Aristotle would have 
needlessly complicated things by pointing out that adding “will be” 
does not always make the significant spoken sound one of either true 
or false when the matter being predicted by the resultant proposi-
tion is a FCE. And he would have complicated things a whole lot more 
if he then turned around and pointed out that there is, however, a 
sense in which the resultant proposition predicting the FCE can be –so 
long as the issue has already been settled– nevertheless one of either 
true or false. Moreover, it is just not typical of a dialectal thinker like 
Aristotle to jump the gun by mentioning this thorny issue to come. 
He is building up to it in front of us so that it comes up organically. 
Indeed, by not addressing exceptions to the rule as to how significant 
spoken sounds become one of either true or false, when he does bring 
it up it stands forth more starkly, which I think is somewhat the point. 
The effect is that in dealing only with statement-making sentences he 
“comes upon” the ones that seem to entail fatalism. 
Objection 2: It is wrong to say that LEM, the rule that, “two con-
tradictory propositions cannot be false simultaneously” (Lukasiewicz 
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1967b 52), can obtain and yet not as well PB. If the only options are 
p-event or not-p-event, then it must be one of them. Say it is p-event. 
In this case the FCP predicting that p-event would occur is true. 
Restricting PB demands restricting LEM, which is what Lukasiewicz 
–himself no mean logician– seemed to realize (cf. 1967a 16-18). But as 
you pointed out, Aristotle affirms LEM. This fact alone does not guar-
antee that he does not restrict PB. However, if you look at Categories 
2a8 and 13b2 he does seem to endorse PB, which I would guess is be-
cause he so wholeheartedly endorses LEM.”10
Reply: First, in Categories 2a8 Aristotle says that “every affirma-
tion, it seems, is either true or false” (emphasis added). I think the “it 
seems” is significant here. Aristotle at least had an intuition that, in 
the case of FCPs, this principle is violated. 
Second, in 13b2 Aristotle says that in regards to an affirmation and 
its negation “it is necessary always for one to be true and the other one 
false.” This is not an expression of PB, but rather RCP. Moreover, RCP 
gets violated in many ways, as we know. The importance of this is not 
only that one of these restrictions is a consequence of PB-restriction, 
as I have shown. It also allows me to remark that if Aristotle is able 
to restrict, as he clearly does in 19a39ff, a principle that he worded so 
strongly as to suggest it never could be violated –and here I call your 
attention to his phrase “it is necessary always” in the above 13b2 pas-
sage– then surely he is willing to restrict a principle he worded so 
weakly as to suggest he was unsure about whether there were any vio-
lations –and here I call your attention again to his phrase “it seems” 
in the above 2a8 passage. 
Third, and most importantly, you can restrict PB without restrict-
ing LEM in the case of FCPs. Indeed, the ontological states of affairs 
demands it. Some futures lead to p-event actualizing, others do not. 
No future, however, does not lead to one or the other. Hence p or not-p 
exhausts the possibilities, meaning that LEM is true. The thing is, we 
cannot say p is one of either true or false precisely because there are 
myriad possible futures any of which can actualize. As I noted above, 
in fact, p is actually caused to be bereft of truth-value precisely for the 
reason that p-event obtains in some possible futures but not in others. 
So while the ontological state of affairs demands the preservation of 
LEM since every possible future either contains or does not contain 
p-event, the ontological state of affairs also demands the restriction of 
PB since it is unsettled which future will actualize. 
10 Sorabji points these two passages out as evidence that Aristotle endorses PB (cf. 95). 
Williams says that all theories that deny that a proposition about the future is one of 
either true or false are absurd (cf. 294). 
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Objection 3: You say that p is not one of either true or false and 
that the same goes for not-p. It follows that you say that neither p nor 
not-p is true. This is something the denial of which Aristotle endors-
es (cf. 18b17-25), which thereby disallows your interpretation of what 
Aristotle’s solution to the argument for fatalism is. That he would re-
ject this solution is for good reason. For even if what you have said is 
sound proof for the fact that p is neither true nor false and that the 
same goes for not-p, and thus that neither p nor not-p is true, this 
entails an absurd result: that the 4-27-3003 p-event neither will nor 
will not happen. But if p-event neither will nor will not happen, then 
it follows that p-event certainly will not happen. This is either be-
cause other events will occur on 4-27-3003 to prevent it or because, 
given the incompossible states of affairs of both p-event happening 
and yet not happening, reality itself is destroyed, undone. To be tru-
er to Aristotle, I suggest that you not go with the latter given that 
he holds that some things, such as certain celestial movements, are 
eternal and thereby cannot be abolished (cf. 1072a21-25). Regardless of 
your choice, though, it is patent that this just means that p is false, not 
neither true nor false. What we have, then, is PB after all. You yourself 
just said that every possible future leads either to p-event or, if not, 
then not to p-event. Yet strangely you say that p being neither true 
nor false reflects this open future. How can it reflect that future when 
never in the future can p-event neither actualize nor not actualize?11 
Reply: PB not holding for p on β-1-11-1000 would entail these prob-
lems. That would mean, you see, that despite the fact that the future 
has already been settled, neither p-event actualized nor not-p-event 
actualized; it would mean something impossible: that the future ends 
up being no way regarding p-event. However, PB not holding for p on 
α-1-11-1000 does not entail these problems. p being neither true nor 
false on α-1-11-1000, and therefore corresponding with the state of af-
fairs in which there are myriad possible paths forking into the future, 
just means that the future is not settled concerning this matter, that 
is, that it is not already locked in whether p-event will occur or not. 
That is all. This fact highlights why p being neither true nor false on 
β-1-11-1000, relative to which the future is already settled, would be 
problematic. Relative to β-1-11-1000, p must reflect the future as it truly 
unfolded, as it was settled by the lapse of time. For this reason, p must 
be one of either true or false. To say otherwise, that p is neither true 
nor false, would be to say that the future turned out no way regarding 
p-event, that p-event neither happened nor did not happen. Those who 
11 This general sort of criticism is presented by many commentators (cf. Albritton 1957; 
Hintikka 482; Sorabji 93; Cicero §38; Anscombe 4).
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raise the objection in question are acting as if I am claiming that it is 
neither true nor false on β-1-11-1000, which would be absurd. 
I do not deny that if neither p nor not-p are one of either true or 
false then that means that both are not true. Some who try to counter 
the objection at hand avoid saying that both being not true means 
that both are false, sometimes even saying that it is wrong to say this 
(cf. Taylor 2). Why do they? Because they know that the usual impli-
cation of both being false is that each one’s opposite is true, which 
is how the fatalist for whom Aristotle is speaking in this bit of text 
is taking it, but which is not how Aristotle in his own voice takes it. 
Realize, though, that we do not have to deny that both not being true 
means that both are false. Instead, we just have to be open to the fact 
that their both being false indicates something different than what we 
may normally think, which again is that each one’s opposite is true. 
For Aristotle, that both are false does not testify to an incompossible 
state of affairs obtaining in the future, which we are led to think it 
does if we take neither p nor not-p being true as affirming that each 
one’s opposite is true. Rather, it just testifies to the fact that the future 
is undecided as of yet whether p-event will occur (cf. Aristotle 19a37).12 
The fatalist who is raising this objection in 18b17-25 is assuming, for 
his own benefit, that both being false means, however, that each one’s 
opposite is true, not that each is undecided. Insofar as he does, he is 
taking advantage of the fact that that is the usual implication if mem-
bers of a contradictory pair are both false. Aristotle should not be read 
as personally ascribing to this sense of what it means for neither to be 
true. After all, at this point in the text he is speaking for the fatalist. 
Objection 4: I think that we can avoid restricting PB, and so too 
avoid the quandaries that arise when we do, and yet still retain the en-
couraging results that came with restricting it: that the future is open 
to some extent. Relative to all the possible futures that course from 
α-1-11-1000, p is surely not true for the reason that you have expressed: 
the future in front of it is not yet settled. But instead of saying that p is 
not one of either true or false, we ought to just say that p is false. And, 
for the same reason, we could say that not-p is true (cf. Prior 1967). 
Reply: The problem with this solution is that it is only an apparent 
preservation of PB. See, p is false on the account just given because it 
is not true. As you admit, it is not true because it is not yet settled. The 
thing is, that it is not yet settled just means that it is not one of either 
true or false, that it is neither true nor false. You can retort: “But that it 
is neither just means that it is false.” In turn, I could say that it is false 
12 Sorabji does not see this second sense. He just points out that the view that both 
propositions are false contradicts 18b17-25. Neither does Hintikka nor Anscombe.
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because it is not true, and that it is not true because it is not settled, 
which means that it is neither true nor false. 
It only takes circling this circle a couple times to see that your 
notion of false is special. The ordinary false would mean that the op-
posite is true: there will be a sea-battle on 4-27-3003. Your notion of 
false, however, is different from the ordinary false, the false intended 
when p-event turns out not to happen. Your false really means neither 
true nor false. Surely you will be eager to admit this when –assuming 
that p-event occurs –you are confronted by a mob yelling: “It is lu-
dicrous that you say the prediction was false when –look– it came 
out true. Your view is no good.” If you care about the mob you will 
explain: “No, I meant false in a different sense –a sense that does not 
mean that its opposite is true”. And when the mob looks like they are 
about to burn you for such witch talk, you will finally assert: “I mean 
false in the sense of neither true nor false.” Your so-called restoration 
of PB, then, is just an expression of PB-restriction. 
Objection 5: You affirm that if the FCP is true in advance, then the 
event it predicts will actualize is fated to actualize. There is never any 
argument for this, though. Explain to me why it the case that “if it is 
already true that a thing will happen ... there can be no possibility that 
it will not” (Albritton 38). 
Reply: FCP p uttered at β-1-11-1000 is true. Yet that does not mean 
that p-event had to happen. The only reason for this, though, is that 
there truly is α-1-11-1000. The thing is, p being true here does mean 
that there can be no possibility that it will not happen. You say no ar-
gument is given for why. But it is actually quite simple: p being true on 
α-1-11-1000 means that every possible future extending from 1-11-1000 
contains p-event, in which case p-event is bound to actualize. 
Objection 6: As you just suggested, there seems to be something 
about the world on α-1-11-1000 that makes it the case, on your view, 
that p is not in fact one of either true or false. But if this FCP’s truth-
value or lack thereof really depends on how the world is as the time 
when it is considered being uttered, 1-11-1000, do not you have to deny 
not only that p is one of either true or false but also, and contrary to 
what you want to do, that the proposition about a contingent event 
in the past prior to 1-11-1000, proposition z, uttered on 1-11-1000 is 
one of either true or false? It would seem you do. See, if you are to 
be consistent, the present that is 1-11-1000 must be such a way as to 
provide for the truth of z just as you are demanding that it be such a 
way as to provide for the truth of p. The thing is, nothing about the 
present state of the world at 1-11-1000 seems to provide for the truth of 
z? Do you see the problem? If you are going to argue that the predic-
tion about the future is not one of either true or false on the grounds 
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that there is no fact presently that requires it being so, then you must 
say –absurdly– the same things about the past. Now, you personally 
can always take what seems to be the Lukasiewicz route and say that 
z is no longer true on 1-11-1000. But I think what I just pointed out 
compels us more so to question the restriction of PB for FCPs (cf. Baylis 
162; Williams 294-295).
Reply: With regard to the past we are talking about the past that 
actualized, the path from the past to now, which as you said we are 
assuming to be 1-11-1000. For sure, there are other histories branching 
back from now, whether we consider now qua α-now or qua β-now. 
However, they are surely not actual given that only one history ac-
tualized: the one that actualized. And while they were at one point 
possible paths to the future, that is, to our now (1-11-1000), they no 
longer have the possibility of becoming actual because the issue has 
been settled by the lapse of time: one of the paths already did actual-
ize. Now, we may not know if the past event in question occurred. But 
it either did or did not. That is for sure. Plus it has already been settled 
which, it being the past and all. Things are different when it comes to 
the future –the future relative to α-now, of course. We know that the 
event predicted by the FCP uttered on α-now did not yet occur. But 
it either will or will not happen. That is for sure. Yet, lest fatalism be 
true, it has not been decided which, it being a FCE and all. 
Although you do not realize it given that p-event is in the future 
relative to 1-11-1000, by considering 1-11-1000 qua β-1-11-1000 you con-
ceive of p-event in terms of a past event. p in turn put on a par with 
the proposition that picks out something contingent in the past, it is 
no coincidence that you find it odd that p cannot be one of either true 
or false when a proposition about the past can be. 
III
I have argued both that Aristotle’s solution to the argument for 
fatalism is to restrict PB for FCPs and that this solution is coherent. 
The solution being in itself coherent of course still does not guarantee 
its particular success as a counter to the argument for fatalism in 9. 
This counter I see as being composed of two moves: a) a highlighting 
of why fatalism does not accord with how things stand to us in our 
everyday lives and b) a restricting of PB for FCPs. I will now explain 
that while a) does not refute fatalism it does have the rhetorical effect 
of emphasizing that the burden of proof is on the fatalist and that a 
fatalist victory will not come so easily. Then I will explain that while 
b), even in light of a), does not refute fatalism either, it nevertheless 
does block the implicit reductio argument for fatalism presented in 9. 
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The supposition that fatalism is false is well-founded phenomeno-
logically. Were fatalism true there would be no need to do what we 
normally do: deliberate and trouble ourselves with such thoughts as “if 
I do this, that will happen; and if do not do this, that will not happen” 
(cf. Aristotle 18b31). This is because whatever will happen was always 
bound to happen at every point in time prior to the actual happening. 
But we do deliberate. This is significant because the practice of delib-
erating about how to act seems to presuppose that those undertaking 
this practice have a genuine say in the matter, where to have a genuine 
say in the matter means that the choosing of what to do in light of the 
deliberating has not already been decided. 
Of course, the very fact that we do deliberate is not sufficient to 
show that fatalism is false. That the falsity of fatalism is not the con-
dition of the possibility for deliberation is clear in that in a fatalistic 
universe we can still deliberate. We will be sitting there, trying to fig-
ure out how to act, as if we really have a choice in the matter. Now, 
it may be that genuine deliberation does require fatalism being false, 
our having true choice in the matter. Alas, Aristotle never makes an 
argument to show that humans do engage in this so-called true delib-
eration. Because all he ever says on this issue is simply that humans 
deliberate, and does not as well demonstrate why the behavior we 
might label “deliberation” is in fact a considering of alternative fu-
tures each of which could very well come about, it is clear that his 
bringing up the fact that we deliberate, while not sufficient to disprove 
fatalism, highlights that fatalism is inimical to how things stand to us, 
and thus is effective at bolstering the antifatalist position to which he 
personally ascribes. 
The same can be said for the other case Aristotle makes as to why 
fatalism being true does not align with our practical belief in a future 
that is open to some extent. He points out that if fatalism is true, then 
at any point in time before John’s cloak wore out it was bound to wear 
out. Aristotle’s response is that we can easily observe –especially in 
light of the fact that John’s wife had been threatening for years to cut 
his cloak up– that this cloak wore out before it was cut up. The thing 
is, saying that the cloak wore out first, that is, before it was cut up, sug-
gests that it was possible for the cloak to have been cut up. 
Now, if this were truly possible, then fatalism would be false. Just 
like before, however, Aristotle does not definitively prove that this is 
truly possible. All he notes is that we find it normal, intuitive, to point 
out that it wore out first, before getting cut up, which means we find 
it normal, intuitive, to think some things could have been otherwise. 
That it was truly possible for it to be cut up, though, is not the condi-
tion of the possibility for our observing that it wore out first, before 
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it was cut up. Aristotle knows this. It is obvious that in order to see 
if something is possible to happen, such as this log catching fire, you 
cannot just attend to the nature of the thing in question. Attend only 
to the nature of the log and you will find that it possibly could burn or 
not burn. What really matters, though, is if in the grand scheme of 
things, that is, when all things are considered, there really is possibil-
ity in both directions. If Laplacian determinism obtains, and the log 
has been determined from the remote past never to burn, then the 
log having the inherent capacity to burn matters not one bit in estab-
lishing that it is truly possible for it to burn. To think it does in this 
case is just to say that what is possible is what seems to us possible, 
that in effect the illusion of things not being fated suffices for fatalism 
being false. This surely is not a strong enough account. 
Why such appeals to how things appear do not refute fatalism is 
brought into relief by the fact that the fatalist can make such appeals 
himself. For example, many people entertain the question “Would I 
want to know when and how I was going to die?” This suggests that 
they accept, at least sometimes, the idea that their future is already 
written. Or I could just say, to drive the point home, that these cases 
Aristotle brings up to show that fatalism is, as Strang puts it, “contra-
dicted by our own experience and the plain evidence of our senses” 
(457) would not move the fatalist. The fatalist is well aware that his 
position is astonishing.
 Let us now turn to the implicit reductio for fatalism in 9. Assume 
for reductio that the future is open to some extent. As Aristotle em-
phasized with his deliberation and cloak cases, this assumption is in 
accord with how things appear. Still, if this desk is white now, on 4-27-
3003, it was true to say a couple thousand years ago, on 1-11-1000, that 
it would be white. But if it was true on 1-11-1000 (or any other arbitrary 
time in the past for that matter) to say that it would be white, it could 
not fail to end up being white as it in fact did. But if something cannot 
fail to happen (as the situation with how the desk cannot fail to end 
up being white expresses in a particular case), then: 
it is impossible for it not to happen; and if it is impossible for some-
thing not to happen it is necessary for it to happen. Everything that 
will be, therefore, happens necessarily. So nothing will come about as 
chance has it or by chance (Aristotle 18b13-15). 
In a successful reductio, nothing that follows from the assump-
tion to be shown absurd can prevent the opposite of the assumption 
from arising. That the fatalist’s argument is not a successful reduc-
tio can be easily discerned. We know that when the fatalist says “if 
p-event is actual now, which assume is 4-27-3003, then p, the FCP 
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predicting that it will be actual on 4-27-3003, was true on 1-11-1000”, 
that just means that p was true on β-1-11-1000. Given the assump-
tion that fatalism is false, however, we know that this is not the only 
1-11-1000. There is also α-1-11-1000, 1-11-1000 where PB does not hold 
for p. The fatalist argument is persuasive only when it tricks us into 
thinking that β-1-11-1000 was the only 1-11-1000. Aristotle’s solution, 
PB-restriction, blocks this argument precisely because the restriction 
of PB is the affirmation of α-1-11-1000. That α-1-11-1000 is no fantasy on 
the assumption that there are FCEs requires that PB be restricted in the 
case of FCPs. This is why I say his solution blocks the argument. But 
this is really the same as saying that the assumption of the reductio, 
that there are real contingencies, blocks the reductio itself. 
Of course, because this is only a block of the fatalist argument, 
Aristotle cannot be said to have disproved fatalism. He has, however, 
shown that fatalists have more work to do to prove their case. They can-
not just appeal to PB. They need to do something more, something that 
requires PB to apply to FCPs. Perhaps they can do what Spinoza seemed 
to think he has done and show that everything has to be absolutely nec-
essary for reasons of ontology –namely, due to the nature of God. 
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